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COMMENTS
NA TIONA L LEA G UE OF CITIES AND THE
PARKER DOCTRINE: THE STATUS OF STATE
SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
I. Introduction
States, as the primary providers of governmental services, ex-
isted well before the formation of our national government.' The
Constitution recognizes this historical fact by creating a federal
government "authorized to act directly on the people within the
powers confided to it rather than solely on the states, and . . .
endowed with an amplitude of powers which might or might not be
used as the future . . . dictate[s]. '" This concept of federalism
under the Constitution does not dictate absolute deference to states'
rights, nor does it demand centralization of control in our national
government. The Framers sought a compromise between these two
courses.' As Justice Black has reasoned, the concept represents "a
system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect
federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the States."4
Judicial decisions since the enactment of the Constitution have
struggled to understand the scope of those powers granted to the
national government and of those reserved by the states.5 At pres-
ent, nowhere is this struggle more perplexing than in cases involving
the exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.
Until recently, the only judicially enforceable limits on Congress'
1. See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868).
2. See Friendly, Federalism: A Forward, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977).
3. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
4. Id.
5. See generally Friendly, supra note 2, at 1020-34.
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exercise of this plenary power have been found in the Bill of Rights'
or in the political process itself where states and individuals can
influence congressional action through their representatives.' In
1976, however, for the first time in over forty years,' the Supreme
Court declared a congressional regulation of interstate commerce to
be an unconstitutional impairment of the sovereignty of state and
local governments. In National League of Cities v. Usery,5 the Court
invalidated an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act 0 which
prescribed minimum wages and maximum hours for state and mu-
nicipal government employees. This exercise of Congress' commerce
power was considered an obstacle to the states' "ability to function
effectively in a federal system."" The Court relied upon the tenth
amendment as providing an affirmative protection of the states
from an overbearing Congress. While the concept of state sover-
eignty imposing a restraint on the exercise of federal power is hardly
novel, National League of Cities represents the Supreme Court's
most recent and emphatic expression of the federalist doctrine. 4
The case signals a growing sensitivity of the Court to the effect of
federal regulation on the autonomy of state and local governments,
6. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (fifth amendment); United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (sixth amendment); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co.,
327 U.S. 178 (1946) (first amendment).
7. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 239-42 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TRIBE 1.
8. The last Supreme Court case which invalidated a regulation of interstate commerce
on state sovereignty grounds was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
9. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). National League ofCities represents the first judicial check on
commerce power since NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), where the
Court announced an expansive view of federal commerce power.
10. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (amending
29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970)).
11. 426 U.S. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
12. 426 U.S. at 842-43. The tenth amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
13. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76
(1868); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 330 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). See also Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7.
14. The Court had also expressed concern for the rights of states in the federal system in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment bars liability for damages
payable out of state treasury) and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (federal court may
not order structural changes in police department as remedy for police invasion of constitu-
tional rights absent showing of high level official encouragement of police misconduct).
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a valued but hitherto moribund concern of the Court. 5 Unfortun-
ately, the decision of a sharply divided Court in National League of
Cities"6 offers little to our understanding of the federal-state bal-
ance, except to remind us that state sovereignty is not a dormant
doctrine.
Clarification of what constitutes state sovereignty in the face of
federal commerce power may be found in the antitrust context. In
1943, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown 7 determined that the
Sherman Act did not apply to state action. This decision was based
on an express concern for the sovereignty of states.'8 Although the
principals in Parker escaped Supreme Court consideration for over
thirty years," the Court has recently given them new importance.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Company,2 the
Court analyzed the Parker doctrine for the fourth time in less than
three years.2 ' In doing so, it established a definition of state sover-
eignty based on what is the express policy of a state legislature."
While this emphasis on a legislative policy mandate helps to over-
come some of the ambiguities inherent in National League of Cities,
it creates novel problems for lower courts faced with questionable
exertions of commerce power by the Congress over states. At the
very least, however, the inquiry into what is a state legislature's
policy provides a useful starting point in understanding our judici-
ary's steadfast concern for the sovereignty of states.
This Comment will consider Parker and National League of Cities
separately as expressions of the state sovereignty doctrine. A com-
parison between these independent developments of state sover-
eignty under the commerce clause will then be presented, delineat-
ing those instances where the very concerns articulated in National
League of Cities were either adopted or abandoned in the recent
15. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirma-
tive Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1068-69 (1977).
16. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
17. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
18. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
19. The Supreme Court did not consider Parker again until 1975 in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
20. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
21. In addition to Goldfarb and City of Lafayette, the Court analyzed Parker in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) and in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977).
22. See text accompanying notes 162-65 infra.
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Parker cases. In examining the congressional exercise of commerce
power over state activity in the antitrust area, the principal aim is
to clarify the parameters of the Court's present conception of state
sovereignty as a limit to federal power.2"
II. State Sovereignty as an Affirmative Limit to the Federal
Commerce Power: National League of Cities v. Usery
In National League of Cities v. Usery, individual cities and states,
the National League of Cities, and the National Governor's Confer-
ence, as plaintiffs, challenged the validity of the 1974 amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").11 These amendments
extended the coverage of federal minimum wage and maximum
hour standards from private employees to all public employees of
states and their subdivisions.25 Application of the standards to pri-
vate employees was previously upheld as a constitutionally valid
exercise of congressional commerce clause power in United States
v. Darby.2" The cities and states asserted, however, that when the
23. The analysis here will emphasize the anticompetitive acts of states and their subdivi-
sions and will not attempt to explore the possible immunity of private actions. Cf. Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Union Pacific R.R. v. United
States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) (dealing with private enterprises asserting a Parker defense). This
Comment will discuss Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., a case against a private utility, only to
the extent it reflects upon the Parker doctrine in general. See notes 111-33 infra and accom-
panying text. For a broader discussion of state action immunity under antitrust laws and the
implications for private action, see Note, Parker v. Brown Revisisted: The State Action
Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898 (1977).
Numerous commentators have addressed the question: how far does the state sovereignty
doctrine extend? See, e.g., Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce
Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115 (1978) (Professor Schwartz
argues that state sovereignty is not a viable constitutional concept and was a misused term
in National League of Cities); TRIBE, supra note 7; Michelman, States' Rights and States'
Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J.
1165 (1977). Michelman and Tribe argue that the state sovereignty doctrine is an effort to
protect citizens' rights to essential governmental services provided by local governments. See
also Note, Federal Securities Fraud Liability and Municipal Issuers: Implications of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1064 (1977).
One commentator has explored the implications of exposing municipalities to treble anti-
trust damages on the doctrine of federalism. See Note, Federal Antitrust Immunity: Exposure
of Municipalities to Treble Antitrust Damages Sets Limit for New Federalism: City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 11 CONN. L. REV. 126 (1978).
24. 426 U.S. at 836.
25. As originally enacted, the Act specifically excluded states and their political subdivi-
sions from its coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1940); 426 U.S. at 836 n.7.
26. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Act was applied to state and municipal government employees, it
unconstitutionally infringed the sovereignty of states in the federal
system." In a five to four decision,2 8 the Supreme Court upheld the
challenge, asserting that to the extent the amendments operated to
"directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not
within the authority granted Congress by [the commerce
clause]. ' ' 2s Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that these amendments were enacted pursuant to the
commerce clause of art. I, which granted plenary authority to Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce. 0 Nonetheless, when Congress
regulates "States as States," according to Rehnquist, it transgresses
an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its plenary commerce
powers.' The Court found the source of this limitation to be con-
tained in the tenth amendment of the Constitution which reserves
to the states, or the people, all powers not delegated to the federal
government.2 As the Court had reasoned one year earlier in Fry v.
United States:"
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating
merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," . . it is not
without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.4
Thus, the Court in National League of Cities did not dispute the
existence of congressional power to regulate wages and hours of
employees, but instead asserted that this power is limited by the
tenth amendment protection of state sovereignty. 5
27. 426 U.S. at 841.
28. J. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court joined by JJ. Stewart, Blackmun,
Powell and C.J. Burger. J. Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion. J. Brennan filed a dissent-
ing opinion in which JJ. White and Marshall joined. J. Stevens wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. Id. at 834.
29. Id. at 852.
30. Id. at 840.
31. Id. at 841.
32. Id. at 842-43.
33. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
34. Id. at 547 n.7.
35. 426 U.S. at 841-45. The Court endorsed the appellant's assertion that "Congressional
enactments which may be fully within the grant of legislative authority contained in the
Commerce Clause may nonetheless be invalid because found to offend against the right to
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The majority in National League of Cities analogized" its ruling
to the Court's decision in New York v. United States,7 where con-
gressional power to tax was found not to include the right to impose
a non-discriminatory tax on the states. Although the Court in New
York v. United States upheld a federal tax on a state-operated min-
eral water business, it cautioned that the invalidity of a tax on
certain state activities might be based wholly on the fact that the
state is "being taxed so as unduly to infringe, in some manner, the
performance of its functions as a government which the Constitu-
tion recognizes as sovereign." ' 8 Thus, in New York v. United States,
a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to tax was
recognized based on the sovereignty of states. A similar limitation
was applied in National League of Cities to the federal power to
regulate commerce.39 The majority in National League of Cities,
however, expressed no view as to the limits created by state sover-
eignty on the exercise of congressional powers under other sections
of the Constitution, such as the spending power, art. I §8 cl. 1, or
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment."0 In addition, apart from
New York v. United States, the Court relied on pre-World War II
cases to sound the federalist theme." More recent Supreme Court
cases had not found that the tenth amendment created such an
affirmative limitation on the exercise of congressional commerce
power. For example, in Fry the wages of all state and local govern-
ment employees were held to be a validly limited by the federal
government under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. The ma-
jority in National League of Cities distinguished the situation in Fry
by finding that the federal regulation involved was an emergency
measure intended to ameliorate severe inflation plaguing the na-
tional economy.42 This "extremely serious problem. . . endangered
trial by jury contained in the sixth amendment, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968), or the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6 (1969)." 426 U.S. at 841.
36. 426 U.S. at 843.
37. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
38. Id. at 588.
39. 426 U.S. at 843 n.14.
40. Id. at 852. For a discussion of states' rights under the fourteenth amendment see Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-48 (1879).
41. E.g., Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S.
559 (1911); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1869).
42. 426 U.S. at 853.
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the well-being of all the component parts of our federal system and
. . . [required] collective action by the National Government. 43
Thus, National League of Cities did not impose state sovereignty as
an absolute barrier to the exercise of federal commerce power.
Rather, "[tihe limits imposed . . .when Congress seeks to apply
[its Commerce power] to the States are not so inflexible as to
preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emer-
gency."44
Another recent decision, Maryland v. Wirtz," did not involve a
national emergency; rather, it concerned an extension of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to school and hospital employees of each state.
The Court in National League of Cities expressly acknowledged that
a factual distinction between school and hospital employees and
police and fire personnel existed." Nevertheless, the majority did
not consider this distinction to have any constitutional merit and
concluded that state sovereignty was impaired in the application of
FLSA to both types of employees.47 As a result, Wirtz was over-
ruled."
Furthermore, in reviving the state sovereignty doctrine, the Court
was careful to note the distinction between the tenth amendment
and the supremacy clause of the Constitution: "It is one thing to
recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individ-
dual businesses . . . subject to the dual sovereignty of the govern-
ment of the Nation and of the State in which they reside."" Such
federal regulation of the private sector would necessarily preempt,
under the supremacy clause of article VI, any state regulation in the
same area. This is to be contrasted with "a similar exercise of con-
gressional authority directed not to private citizens, but to the
43. Id.
44. Id. An analogous case noted by the majority is Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946),
where the scope of Congress' authority under its war power was found not to be limited by a
state's sovereignty.
45. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
46. 426 U.S. at 854-55.
47. Id.
48. Id. The majority observed that Wirtz had relied on dicta in United States v. Califor-
nia, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which announced there to be "no . . limitation upon the plenary
power to regulate commerce. The State can no more deny the power if its exercise has been
authorized by Congress than can an individual." Id. at 185.
49. 426 U.S. at 845.
1980]
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States as States."50 Such regulations of state action cannot with-
stand constitutional scrutiny. As the National League of Cities deci-
sion observes, there exists "attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not
because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative au-
thority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits
it from exercising the authority in that manner."'
In explaining how the 1974 amendments invalidly impaired the
state's attributes of sovereignty, the Court mentioned the potential
impact of increased costs resulting from compliance with the regula-
tions on local governmental bodies.52 The costs would erode the
financial ability of the states and cities to provide important govern-
mental services.13 The actual impact of the challenged legislation,
however, was not the basis for the Court's decision. 4 More central
was the fact that the Act displaced state policies.5 In practical
terms, the Act's application to state and municipal governments
abrogated their choice of hiring employees not possessing minimum
employment requirements and paying such employees less than the
federally prescribed minimum wage." The opinion stated, "the vice
of the Act . . . is that it directly penalizes the States for choosing
to hire governmental employees on terms different from those which
Congress has sought to impose."57 The Act would "significantly alter
or displace the State's abilities to structure employer-employee re-
lationships""5 in areas involving "integral governmental func-
tions."" In sum, after National League of Cities, to determine
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 846.
53. Id. at 846-47. As an example, the Court refers to the State of California's report that
the Act would force a reduction in its police academy training program from 2,080 hours to
only 960 hours. Id. at 847.
54. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that "[w]e do not believe particularized assessments
of actual impact are crucial to resolution of the issue presented. Id. at 851. See also
id. at 874 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 847-48.
56. As Justice Stevens observed, "the Federal Government may not interfere with a
sovereign State's inherent right to pay a substandard wage to the janitor at the state capitol."
Id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57: Id. at 849.
58. Id. at 851.
59. Id. at 855.
[Vol. VIII
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whether an otherwise valid exercise of congressional commerce
power would impermissibly impair state sovereignty, a court must
examine whether state policy choices regarding the delivery of inte-
gral governmental services are being supplanted."
Major difficulties arise in attempting to define the scope of the
state sovereignty doctrine announced in National League of Cities.
Equally difficult is determining its relationship to other areas of
federal commerce clause regulation. The Court offered meager assis-
tance for those attempting to determine when a state acts as a state,
that is, when a state activity constitutes an "integral governmental
function"'" thereby deserving immunity from federal law. The Court
did announce the nebulous principle that "activities typical of those
performed by state and local governments" were sovereign."2 Al-
though several examples of these activities were offered, such as fire
and police protection," the Court refrained from offering a specific
test, and did not provide an exhaustive list of examples.64
A step towards understanding this nebulous standard may be
taken by noting that National League of Cities did not concern itself
60. "Congress may not exercise [commerce clause] power so as to force directly upon the
States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental
functions are to be made." Id.
In a recent case in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,
598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979), state sovereignty, as a restraint on federal commerce power,
was limited to situations where it is shown that "(1) a congressional enactment (in the
exercise of commerce clause powers) operates to displace, regulate or significantly alter (2)
the management, structure or operation of (3) a traditional or integral governmental func-
tion." Id. at 1035-36 (footnotes omitted).
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977), refers
to the scope of the state sovereignty doctrine as defined by "the extent of usurpation of state
policymaking or invasion of integral state functions ... " Id. at 37. The use of the conjunc-
tive "or" in this case appears inconsistent with the letter of National League of Cities which
considered both factors in defining state sovereignty.
61. 426 U.S. at 855. The opinion uses similar phrases apparently to stand for the same
type of activity but which do not serve to clarify exactly what type of activities are sovereign,
for example, "important governmental activities," id. at 847, "those governmental services
which their state's citizens require," id., "integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions," id. at 852, and "integral parts of [states'] governmental activities." Id.
at 854 n.18.
62. Id. at 851.
63. Id. Other examples offered by the Court included sanitation, public health, and parks
and recreation. Id. Such areas, explained the Court, "are typical of those performed by state
and local governments in discharging their dual functions or administering the public law and
furnishing public services." Id. (footnote omitted).
64. Id. n.16.
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with whether each state is performing a function which is exclu-
sively performed by government. 5 This follows from the majority's
rejection of its eight year old decision in Wirtz. There, the Court
observed:
[Vlalid general regulations of commerce do not cease to be regulations of
commerce because a State is involved. If a State is engaging in economic
activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when en-
gaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its
activities to federal regulation."
Despite "obvious differences"" between school and hospital em-
ployees and policemen and firemen, the Court in National League
of Cities asserted that each type of service is an "integral portion of
those governmental services which the States and their political
subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." 8 This con-
clusion overlooks the obvious fact that the services provided by state
hospitals and schools have also been traditionally available from
private sources.
The majority may be giving some deference to this distinction
between governmental services utilized in Wirtz, however, by af-
firming United States v. California," a case which found employees
of state-operated railroads to be covered by federal railroad regula-
tions. 0 The operation of a railroad was unequivocally excluded from
the category of services which the states have regarded as an inte-
gral part of their governmental activities.7 Unfortunately, the Court
offered no explanation of why railroads are not integral.72
65. See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 1128 (discussion of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968) and United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936)).
66. 392 U.S. at 196-97.
67. 426 U.S. at 855.
68. Id.
69. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
70. 426 U.S. at 854-55 n.18.
71. Id. at 854 n.18.
72. See 426 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Amersbach, the court attempted to isolate certain elements commonly attributed to
"integral" governmental functions as found in previous cases.
Among these elements are:
(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is
available to the public at little or no direct expense;
(2) the service or activity is undertaken for the purpose of public service rather
than pecuniary gain;
310 [Vol. VIII
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In Fry v. United States,73 a case reaffirmed by the Court in
National League of Cities,74 Justice Rehnquist recognized the diffi-
culties posed by the characterization of governmental functions as
integral. Explaining that the ambiguities inherent in determining
the scope of state sovereignty would require a case-by-case resolu-
tion, Justice Rehnquist observed
that a line will have to be. drawn somewhere. It is conceivable that the
traditional distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" activities
might in some form prove useful in such line drawing. The distinction sug-
gested in New York v. United States ...between activities traditionally
undertaken by the States and other activities, might also be of service. .... .
In an era of expanding state activity and growing urban problems,
a decision requiring each state to assess which of its activities are
"integral," no matter what the method of line drawing is used, may
have perplexing implications. The ownership or operation of a rail-
road, mill or an irrigation system may be deemed, in certain regions,
as essential as the operation of bridges, street lights, or a sewage
system. Moreover, "[wihat might have been viewed in an earlier
day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activi-
ties may today be deemed indispensable."76 As a result, state agen-
cies accused of violating a federal regulation may argue that its
activity comes within the broad rubric of integral governmental
functions where such a defense may not be justified." On the other
hand, too narrow a view of what is "integral" may stifle a state's
innovative solution to a local problem.
(3) Government is the principal provider of the service or activity; and
(4) government is particularly suited to provide the service or perform the activity
because of a community wide need for the service or activity.
598 F.2d at 1037.
Unfortunately, each of these characteristics of what is "integral" creates problematic dis-
tinctions for determining if a given activity is "integral."
73. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
74. 426 U.S. at 852-53.
75. 421 U.S. at 558 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The need for giving the words "traditional" or "integral" expansive meanings to meet
changing times was also recognized by the Sixth Circuit recently in Amersbach, 598 F.2d at
1037.
77. This possibility is implied by Professor Schwartz. See Schwartz, supra note 23, at
1125.
19801
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
III. Limitations on the Application of Federal Antitrust Laws
to State Action: Parker v. Brown and its Progeny
A. Parker v. Brown
Thirty-three years before the decision in National League of
Cities, the Supreme Court declared federal antitrust laws inappli-
cable to certain actions of states. In Parker v. Brown,"5 a raisin
producer sued a California state agency to challenge the enforce-
ment of an agricultural marketing program. The program, enacted
by the state legislature to restrict competition among growers
and maintain prices in the distribution of raisins, limited the
amount and type of raisins that producers could sell to packers in
specified regions.7 The purpose of the program was to "'conserve
the agricultural wealth of the State' and to 'prevent economic waste
in the marketing of agricultural products' of the state."80 In addi-
tion, the agricultural program "derived its authority and its efficacy
from the legislative command of the state and was not intended to
operate or become effective without that command."'" The Court
concluded that this type of state action was not within the purview
of the Sherman Act. 2 Chief Justice Stone, writing for the majority,
reasoned that Congress intended the Sherman Act to restrain pri-
vate anticompetitive conduct and not to regulate action taken by a
state, its offices or agencies in furtherance of a legislative mandate.83
It is unclear whether the Parker decision is based on a notion of
state sovereignty as an affirmative limitation on the exercise of
federal commerce power or whether the decision rests on a preemp-
tion analysis. 4 It is certain that the Court relied heavily on a con-
struction of the Sherman Act to find the Act inapplicable to states.
Chief Justice Stone reasoned that although the California program
78. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
79. Id. at 347-48.
80. Id. at 346.
81. Id. at 350.
82. Id. at 350-52.
83. Id. at 352.
84. For a discusson of Parker and the preemption doctrine, see Note, Parker v. Brown: A
Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L. J. 1164 (1975). For a further discussion of the constitutional
implications of Parker, see Davidson & Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional
Limits on the Federal Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REv. 575
(1978).
[Vol. VIII
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would definitely violate the Sherman Act if it were "organized and
made effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or con-
spiracy of private persons individual or corporate,"85 because the
Sherman Act makes no mention of state action, the California pro-
gram and the state agencies administering the program could not
be subject to the Act.
It bears noting that the Parker Court assumes that Congress could
in the exercise of its commerce power make the Sherman Act ex-
pressly applicable to state agricultural stabilization programs."
This assumption is based on the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion which permits Congress, in the exercise of a granted power, to
suspend laws by occupying the same legislative field.87 The preemp-
tion doctrine presumes that state regulation is operative until Con-
gress acts.8 If, however, the Parker decision is based on state sover-
eignty as protected by the tenth amendment, Congress may simply
not have the power to apply the Sherman Act to certain "state
action" due to the present Court's rationale in National League of
Cities."' Though the tenth amendment, as an affirmative limitation
on congressional commerce power, was never specifically referred to
in Parker,10 the Court in Parker voiced concern for the effect the
Sherman Act had on state sovereignty.' Expressing the same feder-
alist sentiments found in National League of Cities, the Court in
Parker asserted, "[i]n a dual system of government in which, under
the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress
may constitutionally substract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress.""
85. Id. at 350.
86. Id.
87. See cases cited by the Court, 317 U.S. at 350. Other bases for federal preemption exist
including a federal decision not to act in the field. See TRIE, supra note 7, at 376-77.
88. See, e.g., Adams Express Co. v. Croniger, 226 U.S. 491, 506 (1913); Olsen v. Smith,
195 U.S. 332, 345 (1904).
89. See text accompanying notes 24-34 supra.
90. Just six years earlier in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court found
the federal government to lack inherent power under the commerce clause to regulate the
internal affairs.of the states.
91. "The state ... as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the
Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit." 317 U.S. at 352.
92. Id. at 351.
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In addition, the Court in Parker cited Lowenstein v. Evans93 for
the proposition that a restraint imposed by the state as sovereign is
not prohibited by the Sherman Act. This 1895 circuit court case
held exempt from the Sherman Act a state liquor monopoly estab-
lished by the South Carolina legislature. In finding that the state
legislature's actions were not covered by the Sherman Act the court
observed that
the state is a sovereign having no derivative powers, exercising its sovereignty
by divine right. The state gets none of its powers from the general govern-
ment. It has bound itself by compact with the other sovereign states not to
exercise certain of its sovereign rights, and has conceded these to the Union,
but in every other respect it retains all its sovereignty which existed anterior
to and independent of the Union."
By utilizing these statements of a state's sovereign power, the
Court in Parker may be grounding its decision as much in the tenth
amendment's protection of states as in the preemption doctrine.
While this distinction may not have bearing on the outcome of
Parker, it may be significant in appreciating the developing scope
of the state action doctrine.
Unfortunately, the precise meaning of state action which escapes
antitrust scrutiny is not provided in Parker.95 Nonetheless, the
Court is careful to note that it was not establishing a blanket ex-
emption from the antitrust laws for all state action; rather, two
possible exceptions to Parker were suggested. First, a state may not
authorize private action which violates the Sherman Act merely by
authorizing a party to violate the Act." Second, the Court observed
93. 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
94. Id. at 911.
95. See TRIBE, supra note 7, at 381-82.
96. Id. To support this proposition, the Court cited Northern Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47 (1904). In that case, the defendants argued that because their
holding company had been organized in compliance with the New Jersey corporation law and
was acting consistently with its charter, the company's business practices were immune from
antitrust laws. Rejecting this defense, the Supreme Court declared:
If the certificate of the incorporation of that company had expressly stated that the
object of the company was to destroy competition between competing, parallel lines
of interstate carriers, all would have seen, at the outset, that the scheme was in
hostility to the national authority, and that there was a purpose to violate or evade
the act of Congress.
193 U.S. at 345.
Thus, Parker clearly distinguished a state statute that is merely permissive of private
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that Parker did not involve a question of a governmental entity
becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by
others in restraint of trade, 7 thereby implying that a government
entity might be liable under antitrust laws if it acts as a co-
conspirator. Thus, despite the ruling that the Sherman Act prohib-
ited "individual and not state action,"' 8 the Court in Parker created
the possibility that the Act would apply to certain acts of govern-
mental entities.
B. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
The Parker doctrine and its concept of state action was addressed
by the Court thirty years" later in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. ,oo
There, the Court was faced with an antitrust challenge to a mini-
mum fee schedule for lawyers published by a county bar association
and recommended by the state bar. The plaintiffs brought the ac-
tion against the county and state bar associations to contest the fee
schedules. Although the state bar had never taken any formal disci-
plinary action to compel adherence to the schedules, they had con-
doned their use.' 0' In addition, while the county bar was a private
association, the state bar was an agency of the Virginia Supreme
anticompetitive conduct from one that actually substitutes a policy of governmental regula-
tion for the free market policy of the federal antitrust laws. The former statute is preempted
by the Sherman Act's prohibition of private anticompetitive behavior, while the latter enact-
ment represents a governmental decision not prohibited by the Sherman Act.
97. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
98. Id. at 352.
99. Between 1943 and 1975, the Supreme Court analyzed the state action doctrine in three
cases: Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (rejecting
a defense of compulsion by a foreign sovereign, supported by analogy to Parker, because there
was no indication that the foreign government required, or even approved, the anticompeti-
tive conduct in question); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961) (a concerted effort by persons to influence lawmakers to enact legislation
beneficial to themselves or detrimental to competitors was held not to be within the scope of
the antitrust laws in the same way the state's power in Parker to impose competitive re-
straints was free from Sherman Act prohibitions); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (upholding an antitrust defense to the enforcement of a state
statute which permitted resale price maintenance agreements against nonsigners despite
evidence of a clear state policy, because the statute abdicated all authority to private parties
free of state supervision).
100. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
101. Id. at 776-77.
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Court authorized to administer ethical codes adopted by the
court.'"2
N~evertheless, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a Parker
state action immunity defense. 03 Citing Parker, the Court stated
"[lthe threshold inquiry in determining if an anti-competitive ac-
tivity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to
proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign."'' 4 Neither bar association showed that they had author-
ity from the legislature or the high court to impose competitive
restraints on the legal profession. The state bar, though "a state
agency for some limited purposes,"'' 5 exceeded its statutory author-
ity by "[joining] in what is essentially a private anticompetitive
activity. . . ." " It stood in the identical position as the private
county bar and could claim no immunity as a state agency.
Thus, the Goldfarb decision stands for the proposition that actual
anticompetitive conduct must be required by the state as sover-
eign.10 This was an effort by the Court to clearly distinguish state
action from merely private action, a problem which never arose in
Parker. Significantly, the state must be "acting as sovereign"'' 0 in
compelling the acts in issue. This requirement may be the reason
the Court referred to its inquiry as a threshold one; that is, anticom-
petitive conduct can be required by the state not acting as sover-
eign. Therefore, Parker's suggestion that a state would be liable only
if it had entered into a private agreement'09 was expanded under
Goldfarb to include state instrumentalities performing certain acts
not considered sovereign." 0
102. Id. at 789-90.
103. Id. at 788-92.
104. Id. at 790 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 791.
106. Id. at 792.
107. Id. at 792-93.
108. Id. at 790.
109. See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra.
110. Several lower courts are in accord with the conclusion in Goldfarb. In Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed a district court decision to dismiss an antitrust claim against
the District of Columbia Armory Board, a public body that operates Robert F. Kennedy
Stadium, which had entered into a lease with a professional football team that excluded any
other pro football team from using the stadium. The court rejected the Armory Board's
argument that where direct governmental action, as distinct from private conduct, has caused
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C. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.
Further clarification of the scope of the state action exemption
was provided one year later in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.",
Cantor involved a suit for treble damages and injunctive relief di-
rected against a private electric utility company. Detroit Edison,
the sole supplier of electricity for an area of southeastern Michigan,
provided its customers with limited amounts of light bulbs without
charge. The cost of the bulbs was reflected in the basic rate for
electricity service charged by the utility under a state-approved
tariff. Once these tariffs were in effect the utility could not change
them unilaterally. For this reason the utility claimed that the light
bulb program, the purpose of which was to increase the consump-
tion of electricity, was deserving of Parker protection." 2 Plaintiff,
the owner of a drug store selling light bulbs, asserted that the utility
was using its monopoly power in the distribution of electricity to
restrain competition in the separate market for light bulbs."' Thus,
the issue in Cantor addressed by the majority was "whether the
Parker rationale immunizes private action which has been approved
by a state and which must be continued while the state approval
remains effective."" 4
The Court rejected the defendant's state action defense, finding
the relevant legislation which authorized the Michigan Public Serv-
ice Commission to regulate electricity distribution did not specifi-
cally deal with the sale of light bulbs. Because the state policy
concerning light bulbs was, at best, neutral, there existed no state
policy designed to supplant competition. As the Court explained,
the light bulb program was initiated by the utility and was not an
example of a "private citizen doing nothing more than [obeying]
the alleged injury to a plaintiff, the provisions of the federal antitrust laws are inapplicable.
Quoting Judge Goldberg in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), the court noted, "[t]he instant case involve[s] state participa-
tion. That proposition, however, only begins the analysis, for it is not every governmental act
that points a path to an antitrust shelter. We reject the facile conclusion that action by any
public official automatically confers exemption. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1970)." 444 F.2d at 934 (footnote omitted).
111. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
112. Id. at 585.
113. Id. at 581 n.3.
114. Id. at 581.
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the command of his state sovereign.""' 5 In fact, the utility imple-
mented the program before the Michigan regulatory commission
was even established."6 Therefore, the light bulb exchange program
was not "state" but merely "private" action fully subject to the
Sherman Act.
One important facet of Cantor was that a balancing test that
weighs the federal interest in competition and state interests in
regulation may be introduced to decide if the Parker doctrine will
be operative. This approach was suggested by Justice Blackmun in
his concurring opinion in Cantor, where he endorsed a "rule of rea-
son" analysis similar to the test used in traditional equal protection
review."7 This approach would further require that a state regula-
tory scheme be reasonably and rationally related to the policies it
purports to promote. Not surprisingly, Justice Blackmun, that same
year in National League of Cities, suggested that a balancing ap-
proach be used in order to determine whether federal power is
applicable to state action."'
115. Id. at 592.
116. Id. at 600.
117. Id. at 609 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
118. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Support for such a balancing test to determine the parameters of state sovereignty can also
be found in the majority opinion in National League of Cities where the Court affirmed Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), by stating, "[the limits imposed upon the commerce
power when Congress seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude
temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency." 426 U.S. at 853. See also,
Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 720 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 454 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 737 (1977).
Several commentators, however, have asserted that such a balancing test would be inimical
to the tenets of federalism and the Parker rationale. See Davidson & Butters, Parker and
Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the Federal Interdiction of Anticompetitive State
Action, 31 VAND. L. REV. 575, 592 (1978). ("Such a balancing test has no place in the state
action doctrine . . . because it does not address the only constitutionally significant issue -
whether the activity under review is sovereign regulatory conduct not subject to antitrust
proscription."). But see Slater, Antitrust and Governmental Action: A Formula for
Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. L. REV. 71 (1974). Professor Slater asserts that "a state
program of dubious merit should not prevail over the federal interest of protecting competi-
tion merely because the state legislature has spoken." Id. at 103. Slater advocates a balancing
test, id. at 104-08, despite recognizing that the Sherman Act does not apply "to state action
taken in pursuit of public policy goals, no matter how weak the public goals or how serious
the injury to competition." Id. at 91.
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D. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona" provided the Court with an oppor-
tunity to carry the state action doctrine beyond the threshold ques-
tion addressed in Goldfarb. In Bates, two Arizona lawyers who had
violated a disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising by lawyers as-
serted that the advertising prohibition violated federal and state
antitrust laws.'2 0 The disciplinary rule and the procedure for its
enforcement were embodied in the rules of the Arizona courts.'2'
The Supreme Court concluded that this rule was exempt from the
federal antitrust laws under Parker because it was an activity of the
State of Arizona acting as sovereign.'
In reaching the determination that Arizona was acting in its sov-
ereign capacity, the Court first remarked that the appellant's claim
was against a state entity rather than a private party.2 3 Unlike the
situation in Cantor, a state entity, the Arizona Supreme Court, was
the real party in interest. Furthermore, the disciplinary rules pro-
hibiting advertising were required of all attorneys.12 This distin-
guished the circumstances in Goldfarb where the Virginia Supreme
Court rules merely recommended the use of minimum fee schedules.
Thus, the threshold inquiry established in Goldfarb was satisfied in
Bates.
Finding that state action was clearly involved, the Court went-on
to address the question of whether there was a clear state policy
involved to supplant competition. 25 Finding there was, the State
Supreme Court's enforcement of the prohibition on advertising was
declared exempt from the antitrust laws under Parker. To highlight
its analysis of this second criterion for determining whether Parker
applied, the Court compared the situation in Cantor.' In Cantor,
119. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
120. The petitioners also claimed that the disciplinary rule violated their first amendment
rights. After rejecting the antitrust claim, the Supreme Court struck down the rule on those
grounds. Cf. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state
law which prohibited advertisement of retail drug prices was found to violate first amendment
rights).
121. 433 U.S. at 355.
122. Id. at 357.
123. Id. at 361.
124. Id. at 359-60.
125. Id. at 361.
126. Id.
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"the State had no independent regulatory interest in the market for
light bulbs,""'2 and "an exemption for the program was not essential
to the State's regulation of electric utilities.' ' 18 In contrast, the
state's interest in "regulating lawyers is especially great since law-
yers are essential to the primary governmental function of adminis-
tering justice. .. . 2 Moreover, the Bates Court viewed the prohi-
bition of legal advertising as "a clear articulation of the State's
policy with regard to professional behavior."'30 The rules had a cred-
ible regulatory justification and did not merely involve the acquiesc-
ence of the state.' Significantly, the majority found the circum-
stances in Bates to mitigate its "concern that federal policy is being
unnecessarily and inappropriately subordinated to state pol-
icy .... "1p32 This same concern had been voiced one year earlier by
Justice Brennan in his scathing dissent in National League of
Cities. 33
After Bates, the test to be applied in determining whether sover-
eign activity is present is as follows: first, does the state require the
activity or conduct, and second, does the activity fulfill a clear state
policy of supplanting competition. In addition, the majority of the
Court has introduced to the examination of state sovereignty an
express concern over whether the state interest in the activity de-
servedly outweighs the federal interest in prohibiting anticompeti-
tive action.
E. City of Lafayette v. Loui8iana Power & Light Co.
This two-tiered test for determining state sovereignty received
further application by the Supreme Court in City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., the Court's most recent consideration
127. Id. (quoting Cantor, 428 U.S. at 584-85, 604-05, 612-14 (concurring opinions)).
128. 433 U.S. at 361.
129. Id. at 361-62 (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792).
130. 433 U.S. at 362.
131. This was the crux of the Court's distinction between Cantor and Bates. In Cantor,
the state could be said to have, at best, only acquiesced to the light bulb program. Bates,
however, involved an affirmative regulatory act by the state. Id.
132. Id.
133. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 859-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). "There is no room in our scheme of government for the assertion of state power in
hostility to the authorized exercise of Federal power." Id. (quoting The Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913)).
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of the Parker doctrine. 3  This case presented the Court with the
novel issue of whether the Parker doctrine extended to the anticom-
petitive acts of cities. 35 By finding that Parker did not apply in all
134. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
135. Id. at 391.
Several lower courts had previously faced the issue of antitrust liability for state subdivi-
sions but with mixed results. Compare Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975)
(boycott of plaintiff-supplier's beverages in municipal facilities not protected under Parker);
Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated 435 U.S. 992
(1978), judgment reinstated 582 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 873 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Kurek] (anticompetitive practices of local Park District in operating
golf courses not protected under Parker because no state policy shown); Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (no exemption
for the District of Columbia Armory Board where it granted an exclusive lease of Robert F.
Kennedy stadium to a professional football team); Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia
State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 941 (1978) (district court held there was no immunity for a state bar association
attempting to restrict the working of title opinions; the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded
the decision so that the trial court could consider in its analysis of Parker the results of a
state court suit which was determining the proper role of the state bar association under state
law); and Brenner v. State Bd. of Motor Vehicle Mfrs., Dealers & Salesmen, 413 F. Supp.
639 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (state agency exempt if its action is compelled by the state); with Jeffrey
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 518 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1975) (allegation of anticompeti-
tive practices resulting in unfair telephone rate structure; express state delegation of author-
ity to municipalities to set telephone rates makes practice protected under Parker); Saenz v.
University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973) (organization within the
university was granted immunity from an alleged conspiracy involving a sponsored event);
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 850 (1970) (immunity granted only where the state's legislature affirmatively pro-
vides for comprehensive regulation); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433
F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970) (public transportation body created by the legislature was immune);
E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 947 (1966) (immunity granted airport officials entering into a price fixing agreement
as conducting a valid governmental function); Alphin v. Henson, 392 F. Supp. 813 (D. Md.
1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 85 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976) (municipality not liable
under antitrust laws for the anticompetitive acts of its airport manager under the Parker
doctrine); and Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (immun-
ity granted where the city acted within its powers in exclusively leasing the city coliseum to
a single wrestling promoter).
See also, Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated 435 U.S. 992(1978),
judgment reinstated 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 1224 (1979). There,
the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court opinion that held that a municipality's enforcement
of a zoning ordinance restricting the sale of liquor was protected under Parker. The circuit
court remarked that there was no evidence showing that a state policy was involved and thus
remanded the case. 559 F.2d at 381.
Similarly, in City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n., 562 F.2d 280, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1977),
the circuit court reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-hospital asso-
ciation because of the lack of showing of state compulsion. The Supreme Court vacated this
decision, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), for reconsideration in light of City of Lafayette.
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instances to municipalities, the Court illuminated its conception of
state sovereignty under the antitrust laws.
In City of Lafayette, two cities organized under the laws of the
State of Louisiana were granted the power by the state to own and
operate electric utility systems both within and beyond their city
limits. They brought an antitrust action against the Louisiana
Power & Light Company ("LP&L"), an investor-owned electric
service utility, which was the municipalities' only competition in
the areas beyond their city limits. When LP&L counterclaimed al-
leging antitrust violations on the part of the municipal utilities,'3 I6
the cities moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the grounds that the
Parker doctrine rendered federal antitrust laws inapplicable to
them. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the district court ruling in favor of the cities. 7 Relying
primarily on Goldfarb, 3 the Fifth Circuit declared that subordinate
state governmental bodies are not ipso facto exempt from antitrust
law.'39 Only when the state legislature contemplates the anticompe-
titive acts of a municipality will a city enjoy the sovereign status of
the state."" The Supreme Court affirmed this decision five to four
and remanded the case to decide whether the state had contem-
plated that the operation of the city utility would be anticompeti-
tive."'
136. The counterclaim alleged that the cities, with a nonparty electric cooperative, had
conspired to engage in sham litigation against LP&L to delay or prevent the construction of
a nuclear electric generating plant, to eliminate competition within city limits by use of
covenants in their respective debentures, to exclude competition in certain markets by using
long term supply agreements, and to displace LP&L in certain areas by requiring customers
of LP&L to purchase electricity from petitioners as a condition of continued water and gas
service. 435 U.S. at 392 n.6.
137. 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976). The district court granted the cities' motion in an
unpublished opinion. While noting its reluctance to exempt an enterprise which was "clearly
a business activity" from the antitrust laws, the district court found that the plaintiffs' status
as cities was sufficient to bring all their conduct within the "state action" exemption as
announced in Parker. Id. at 433. The district court also relied on Saenz v. University Inter-
scholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973) which held that a state agency which ran
interscholastic competitions was not answerable under the Sherman Act.
138. Goldfarb was decided after the trial court reached its conclusion in City of Lafayette.
532 F.2d at 433.
139. Id. at 434.
140. Id. at 434-35.
141. 435 U.S. at 389. J. Brennan, author of the plurality opinion, was joined by JJ.
Marshall, Powell and Stevens. C.J. Burger wrote an opinion concurring with respect to Part
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In deciding that municipally-operated utilities are not necessarily
covered by the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court altered several of
the premises upon which the decision in Parker was based.' Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, initially reexamined the purpose
of the antitrust laws and concluded that Congress intended the laws
to apply to local governments. Noting that municipalities and
States have been held to be "persons" within the meaning of the
antitrust laws and may, therefore, maintain treble damage actions
as plaintiffs," 3 the plurality concluded that this "plainly
preclude[d] a reading of. . . 'persons' to include municipal utility
operators that sue as plaintiffs but not . . . such municipal opera-
tors when sued as defendants.""' According to Justice Brennan, if
Congress wished to exclude cities from coverage of the Sherman Act
they would have done so explicitly.' This conclusion, however, con-
flicts directly with the Supreme Court's finding in Parker that
"nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history ' . .
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature.""' In fact, the
Parker opinion, by explaining that Congress could restrain such
state activity because of its affect on interstate commerce if it so
desired, assumes such restraints do not presently exist in the Sher-
man Act.
The Court's analysis in City of Lafayette is further prefaced by a
reading of the legislative history of the Sherman Act as establishing
"a regime of competition as the fundamental principle governing
commerce in this country.""' 7 This presumption against implied
I of the opinion and concurring in the judgment. J. Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which
JJ. White and Rehnquist joined. J. Blackmun also wrote a dissenting opinion.
142. As mentioned earlier, for the Parker doctrine to apply the state legislature must
"require" that the activity of the state subdivision occur and, second, that the activity be in
fulfillment of a clear state policy to supplant competition. See text accompanying note 133
supra.
143. The Court cites Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), which held that "any person"
under § 7 of the Sherman Act includes States, and Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) which held that a city is a "person" within the meaning of § 8
of the Sherman Act.
144. 435 U.S. at 397.
145. Id. at 397 n.14.
146. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
147. 435 U.S. at 398.
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exclusions from coverage of antitrust laws is not easily defeated.'4 s
One policy which will override the presumption of inclusion is the
doctrine of federalism, first isolated in the antitrust context in
Parker v. Brown. 9 Consistent with the dissent in National League
of Cities, however, the plurality in City of Lafayette warned that
federalism should not be given absolute reverence: "the recognized
exclusions have been unavailing to prevent antitrust enforcement
which, though implicating those fundamental policies, was not
thought severely to impinge upon them."'50 The Court obliquely
discredits the municipalities' position in City of Lafayette by ad-
monishing petitioners that their arguments "cannot prevail unless
they demonstrate that there are countervailing policies which are
sufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption"' 5 ' in favor of the
federal policy for competition. This qualified description of federal-
ism seems to be contrary to Parker's assessment of federalism in the
antitrust context, where the Court noted a presumption in favor of
state sovereignty.'52 Thus, the required showing that a state policy
intends to supplant competition has apparently been extended in
City of Lafayette to overrule the presumption in Parker in favor of
state sovereignty. As Professor Paul E. Slater has noted about
148. Id. at 399.
149. The plurality isolated two policies which were sufficiently weighty to overcome this
presumption. Aside from the Parker doctrine, the Court observed the need for open communi-
cation between the polity and its lawmakers and the protection of citizens rights to petition.
435 U.S. at 399. This policy was expressed by the Court in Eastern R.R. Presidents Confer-
ence v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), where it was held that a concerted
effort by persons to influence legislators to enact laws beneficial to them but detrimental to
others is not within the scope of the antitrust laws.
150. 435 U.S. at 400. It was Justice Brennan who two years earlier had dissented so
vigorously to the Court's enunciation of federalism in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833,
856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan regarded the Court's decision there "as reflect-
ing nothing but displeasure with a congressional judgment." Id. at 872. "States," he opined,
"are not immune from all federal regulation under the Commerce Clause merely because of
their sovereign status." Id. at 873 (emphasis in original) (quoting Fry v. United States, 421
U.S. 542, 548 (1975)). "iFlor by empowering Congress to regulate commerce ... the States
necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such
regulation." 426 U.S. at 873 (quoting Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
151. 435 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added).
152. The plurality in City of Lafayette quoted the observation made in Parker that "in a
dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose
to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress." Id. (quoting Parker, 317 U.S. at 351).
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Parker, "a fair reading of the case indicates that the Court believes
that the Sherman Act, and its policy in favor of competition, do not
apply to state action taken in pursuit of public policy goals, no
matter how weak the public goals or how serious the injury to com-
petition."'' 3 After City of Lafayette, that policy must be
"sufficiently weighty" to overcome the presumption in favor of fed-
eral policies.
In addressing the specific application of Parker to the electric
utility in City of Lafayette, the Court discussed the distinction be-
tween cities and states in the federal system.' Municipalities do
not receive "all the federal deference of the States that create
them,"' 5 and as a result, municipal acts are not automatically acts
of the state as sovereign. The plurality based this distinction on
cases under the eleventh amendment which have held consistently
that cities are not protected, as are states, from suits in federal
courts.'56 The basic rationale for these decisions is that immunity
attaches to the state only in its sovereign capacity.'57 Municipal
corporations are essentially political and are considered distinct
from the state as sovereign.' Justice Brennan's application of this
rationale of eleventh amendment cases in City of Lafayette has
justification. Though municipalities are "instrumentalities of the
State for the convenient administration of government within their
limits,"'' 9 cities are typically free to adopt many of their own poli-
cies. 10 At best, state policy may be neutral, which, according to
153. Slater, supra note 118, at 91.
154. Lower courts have made the distinction in the Parker context before. See, e.g.,
Kurek, supra note 135, at 589; Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d at 1279-80. Contra, New
Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 370 n.15 (9th Cir. 1974) (Parker immunity
applies whenever a state or its subdivisions are implicated).
155. 435 U.S. at 412.
156. Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974)); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
157. See S.J. Groves & Sons Co, v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 579
(D.N.J. 1967).
158. See Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (S.D. Tex.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1978) (municipalities traditionally
not protected by eleventh amendment due to separate existence from the state).
159. See Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883).
160. 435 U.S. at 414. Indeed, the respective policies may conflict. An example of a dispar-
ity in policies offered by the Court is a state public utility commission's adoption of a policy
prohibiting the specific anticompetitive practices in which the municipality engages. The
commission would be unable to enforce that policy with respect to municipalities because it
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Justice Brennan, is an insufficient basis for allowing a city's par-
ochial interests to impair the Congressional goal of eliminating anti-
competitive conduct.''
On the other hand, the distinction created by the plurality pres-
ents difficulties when distinguishing municipalities from other sub-
divisions of the state such as the state bar association involved in
Bates and Goldfarb or the agricultural commission in Parker. The
same potential for pursuit of parochial interest exists with these
organizations. Thus, while City of Lafayette established a test for
deciding when the rift between cities and states may be bridged, the
decision also addressed the test for sovereignty under Parker.
To gain sovereign status under the Parker doctrine a municipal-
ity's anticompetitive action must be within those actions contem-
plated by the state legislature.' 2 It should be noted, however, that
this is a weaker standard than that required as a threshold test in
Goldfarb when the Court demanded a showing that the state bar
association was required or compelled to act in an anticompetitive
fashion.' 3 Nevertheless, the test appears consistent with Parker,
which referred to restraints on a "state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature."'6 4 In addition, City of
Lafayette requires that the municipality's actions be pursuant to a
state policy of displacing competition with regulation or monopoly
public service. '
IV. Constitutional Implications of the Parker Doctrine: The
Present Scope of State Sovereignty
From Parker to City of Lafayette, the development of standards
that define the scope of the state action exclusion from antitrust
lacks jurisdiction over them. In such a case, "it would be difficult to say that state policy
fosters, much less compels, the anticompetitive practices." 435 U.S. at 414 n.44. See
generally Michelman, supra note 23.
161. 435 U.S. at 412-14.
162. Id. at 413. This does not mean that anticompetitive municipal action which is lawful
under state law, but is not state-directed, enjoys immunity from federal antitrust laws. Id.
at 415 n.45.
163. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. In his concurring opinion in City of Lafayette, Chief
Justice Burger, the author of Goldfarb, announced that he would require a showing of state
compulsion. 435 U.S. at 425 n.6.
164. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
165. 435 U.S. at 413.
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laws has been consistent with judicial concern for "our national
traditions and governmental structure of federalism."'' 6 The scope
of coverage of the Sherman Act over state entities was limited in
Parker but then refocused in Goldfarb, Carter, Bates and City of
Lafayette after a 32-year hiatus by the Court from consideration of
the doctrine. As we have seen, these more recent applications of
Parker have refined the definition of what constitutes sovereign
state activity under the antitrust laws. Outside of the context of the
Sherman Act, this interest in state sovereignty under congressional
commerce power lay dormant until the Court's polemical decision
in National League of Cities.
The relationship of the federalist principles announced in
National League of Cities to the Parker doctrine was noted by Chief
Justice Burger in City of Lafayette. ,67 In his concurring opinion, the
Chief Justice observed that "the Parker decision was . . . firmly
grounded on principles of federalism,"'' 8 and employed the same
emphasis on state sovereignty that the Court later used in National
League of Cities. The importance described earlier'69 of state sover-
eignty as the jurisprudential basis for both Parker and National
League of Cities is highlighted by the historical context in which the
decisions had been made. Both cases were decided at a time when
expansive federal regulation under the commerce clause presented
the threat of compromising the autonomy of states. By the time it
deliberated over Parker, the Supreme Court had decided that con-
166. Id. at 400.
167. Id. at 421-24. The plurality did not consider National League of Cities to be even
"tangentially implicated." 435 U.S. at 412-13 n.42. There is a distinction that can be made
between the Parker doctrine and National League of Cities. Parker involved a judicial con-
struction of the Sherman Act where it was found that because Congress did not expressly
include states within its coverage, inclusion would not "lightly" be inferred. 317 U.S. at 351.
On the other hand, National League of Cities involved federal regulations clearly intended
to apply to the states. It was not an example of the Court's reluctance to interpret legislation
in such a way as to alter the federal-state balance of power. See 426 U.S. at 858 n.2. (Brennan,
J., dissenting); cf. Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 285-87 (1973)
(majority of the Court refused to read the 1966 amendments to FLSA as granting state
employees a federal cause of action against state governments in federal district courts be-
cause it would be inimical to the eleventh amendment). It could be said, therefore, that in
City of Lafayette the issue of a constitutional impairment of state sovereignty is never reached
because of the Court's inquiry into whether the utility is state action of the kind the Sherman
Act was not meant to cover.
168. 435 U.S. at 421.
169. See pt. III (A) supra.
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gressional power under the commerce clause was very broad and
that "persons" under the Sherman Act included states and munici-
palities.7 0 Similarly, National League of Cities was decided in the
face of four decades of decisions to the contrary.'7' Chief Justice
Burger acknowledged these trends by explaining:
Our conception of the limits imposed by federalism are bound to evolve,
just as our understanding of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause has
evolved. Consequently, since we find it appropriate to allow the ambit of the
Sherman Act to expand with evolving perceptions of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, a similar process should occur with respect to
"state action" analysis under Parker. That is, . . . the scope of the Sherman
Act's power should parallel the developing concepts of American federal-
ism.172
Recent decisions by the Court, notably City of Lafayette, indicate
that the analysis of the scope of state sovereignty under Parker, if
it is indeed parallel to the doctrine of state sovereignty espoused in
National League of Cities, may help to clarify the problems inherent
in the National League of Cities decision.
Before comparing these cases, it is worth noting that according to
City of Lafayette coverage of the Sherman Act over states will now
be presumed in the first instance.' This analysis in City of
Lafayette may indicate that the Court's view of the "newly an-
nounced state sovereignty doctrine in National League of Cities""'
has been refocused to give greater assurance that federal regulation
will not be easily neutralized. The plurality's discussion of the pre-
sumption against exclusions from antitrust laws serves as a caveat
to the application of the test set out by City of Lafayette; that is, if
the state-approved anticompetitive activity conflicts severely with
the federal interest in fair competition, federal antitrust laws might
prevail. 175
170. Id. at 420-21.
171. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 1115.
172. 435 U.S. at 421 n.2.
173. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
174. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 822 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
175. At least one lower court has supported this dicta. See Missouri v. National Organiza-
tion for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289, 303 (W.D. Mo. 1979) which held that antitrust laws
did not apply to a boycott in furtherance of political, not marketplace, goals.
The plurality in City of Lafayette did state, however, that its decision does not "preclude
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A. When Is State Action Sovereign?
An important implication of Parker's progeny for the federalist
doctrine concerns the analysis of what is an integral governmental
function. As discussed above, National League of Cities, in general,
focused on the type of activity involved as much as it did on the
identity of the parties to determine if a local governmental function
enjoyed a sovereign status.7 ' The question addressed by the Court
was whether the determination of wages and hours of employment
were "functions essential to separate and independent existence.""'
In City of Lafayette, though faced with the commercial activities of
a municipal electric utility, the Court refused to analyze the Parker
exemption in terms of the type of activity engaged in. 7 ' Thus, even
after City of Lafayette, the problem of deciding what types of state
activities will be considered immune from federal regulation pers-
ists. Justice Brennan apparently recognized this problem when he
noted that the cities are competing with private utilities. 7" This
observation is reminiscent of the inquiry established by the Court
in National League of Cities. As Professor Bernard Schwartz has
noted about the test for finding sovereign state action under that
case:
[T]he question no longer is whether the state is performing a function which
only government performs, as opposed to engaging in activities which are also
engaged in by others. The test now is whether the state is performing a service
which the states have traditionally afforded their citizens, or whether the
state activity to which the congressional command was directed was... in
an area that the States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental
activities. 11"
Rather than pursue this characterization of proscribed city activi-
ties in developing a case for accountability under antitrust laws,
City of Lafayette focuses on a distinction between cities and states.
municipal government from providing services on a monopoly basis" provided the State has
directed or authorized the anticompetitive practice. 435 U.S. at 416-17.
176. See pts. I & II supra.
177, National League of Cities,- 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559,
565 (1911), which quoted Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868)).
178. For a contrary interpretation of City of Lafayette, see Comment, The Erosion of
State Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 165, 182 (1978).
179. 435 U.S. at 403-08.
180. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 1129 (emphasis added).
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Municipal acts, according to the plurality, are not automatically
acts of the state as sovereign. Thus, the federal antitrust laws may
apply to a city-run utility. City of Lafayette is the first time the
Court has drawn this distinction in a case involving limitations on
congressional commerce power. The Parker opinion indicated that
the Court viewed municipalities and states in the same light;"'
moreover, National League of Cities had treated the two entities
equally.' 2 As "the denomination 'political subdivision' implies,"
Justice Rehnquist noted in writing the majority opinion in National
League of Cities'3 and Justice Stewart alluded to in his dissent in
City of Lafayette,' 4 "the local governmental units which Congress
sought to bring within the Act derive their authority and power from
their respective States.""' Therefore, "[i]nterference with integral
governmental services provided by such subordinate arms of a state
government is therefore beyond the reach of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause just as if such services were provided
by, the State itself.""'8 Despite being presented with a non-
traditional governmental function, the Court utilized the city-state
distinction and avoided application of the National League of Cities
standard of state action.
In his concurring opinion to City of Lafayette Chief Justice Burger
strived to revitalize the integral governmental functions test of state
sovereignty developed in National League of Cities. The Chief Jus-
tice observed that National League of Cities focused its examination
of sovereignty on a determination of whether the state's interest
181. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52 (case involved "no question of the state or its munici-
pality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint
of trade").
182. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855 n.20. See also Tribe, supra note 15, at 1069
n.20, and Michelman, supra note 23, at 1169. In Amersbach, the Sixth Circuit treated cities
the same as states for purposes of determining the extent of state sovereignty. 598 F.2d at
1037.
183. 426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
184. 435 U.S. at 430.
185. 426 U.S. at 855-56 n.20. See also 1 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.08(a)
(1971) (municipalities are creations of the state legislature and derive authority from and
exercise powers delegated by the state government).
186. 426 U.S. at 855-56 n.20. Justice Stewart noted in City of Lafayette that under many
other provisions of the Constitution a municipality is equated with the state. 435 U.S. at 430
n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing e.g., Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (double jeapordy
clause); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (fourteenth amendment); Trenton v.
New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (impairment of contract)).
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involved "functions essential to separate and independent exist-
ence.' ' 18 7 "The running of a business enterprise," he concluded, "is
not an integral operation in the area of traditional government func-
tions."'1 8 Alternatively, Chief Justice Burger said that "[e]ven if
this were not generally true, the particular undertaking at issue
here-the supplying of electric service-has not traditionally been
the prerogative of the State."'8 9 Parker protection, therefore, should
not apply to this type of activity. The Chief Justice suggested that
there be a supplemental inquiry to the Goldfarb test of whether
the state required the challenged activity. When proprietary acti-
vities of the state are involved, the court must inquire "whether
the implied exemption from federal law 'was necessary in order to
make the regulatory Act work, and even then only to the minimum
extent necessary.' ",0 This additional test would insure that the
goals of the Sherman Act are not unnecessarily thwarted.''
187. 435 U.S. at 423.
188. Id. at 424.
In his dissent in National League of Cities, Justice Brennan stated that the only true limit
on commerce powers was that it may not infringe individual liberties. 426 U.S. at 858. Several
commentators have elaborated on this view and interpreted the majority's list of "traditional
governmental functions," 426 U.S. at 851, to be activities which provide basic rights of a
state's citizens and are therefore protected. See Michelman, supra note 23; Tribe, supra note
15. Two commentators have criticized this analysis as a failure to "recognize that the charac-
ter of the service affected by the minimum wage law in Usery is irrelevant to the Court's
decision." Davidson & Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the
Federal Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REv. 575, 604 n.135 (1978).
They see the proper issue in National League of Cities to be "whether states shall be free
from federal commerce power interference to make certain economic decisions that funda-
mentally affect their role as coordinate sovereigns in the federal system." Id. However, it is
precisely this role as sovereign which Michelman and Tribe sought to define. Michelman,
supra note 23, at 3; Tribe, supra note 15, at 1076 n.42. City of Lafayette sets up criteria for
determining whether a municipality's actions were those of the state.
189. 435 U.S. at 423.
190. Id. at 426 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Cantor, 428 U.S. at 597).
191. 435 U.S. at 424-26.
Some commentators have argued that Parker should not protect purely commercial activ-
ity by states. Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 950, 965 (1970); Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review,
72 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18 (1972); Saveri, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to Public
Bodies, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 217, 227 (1970); Slater, supra note 118, at 89-90. The argument is
supported by language in Parker that emphasizes the governmental character of the regula-
tion under attack. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 352 ("The state ... , as sovereign, imposed the
restraint as an act of government .... "). Only one district court, however, has accepted
the argument. Reid v. University of Minn., 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (In
dictum, the court seriously questioned whether the Parker exemption would cover a state
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Because of the majority's use of the legislative mandate test in
lieu of this analysis, however, the continued viability of the
governmental-proprietary distinction as a tool for determining the
scope of state sovereignty is doubtful. "' To the local government
official trying to determine whether the antitrust laws or other fed-
eral regulations will apply to a proposed program, the distinction's
demise may spell welcome relief. The conclusion that electric utili-
ties are proprietary and, therefore, not integral governmental func-
tions'93 is based on tradition rather than on any rational criteria. As
the problems faced by urban governments evolve, so will the citi-
zenry's expectations of what are appropriate governmental services.
Just as hospitals went from being accountable under federal regula-
tions to a status of immunity, " electric utilities may someday, in
certain regions, provide an integral governmental function. 5
agency acting as a commercial enterprise and competing with other businesses in the produc-
tion, sale and distribution of books in interstate commerce.).
192. The commercial-governmental distinction was explicitly rejected in New Mexico v.
American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 371-72 (9th Cir. 1974), and in the Fifth Circuit
decision in City of Lafayette, 532 F.2d 431, 434 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Ladue Local
Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970) (upholding an agency's
operation of a monopolistic school bus system. pursuant to a legislative mandate; disregarded
governmental-proprietary distinction); accord, Continental Bus Sys. Inc. v. City of Dallas,
386 F. Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
But see Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt
From Sherman Act Coverge Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547, 1584 (1977),
where the author argues that because the distinction is applied to municipal action in elev-
enth amendment immunity cases, the Fifth Circuit in City of Lafayette may have erred.
193. Justice Douglas would conclude otherwise: "A State's project is as much a legitimate
governmental activity whether it is traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or conducted
for profit." New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
At least one lower court has interpreted the terms "traditional" and "integral" found in
National League of Cities expansively in order "to meet changing times." Amersbach v. City
of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979). There, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the operation of the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport was an integral
governmental function within the meaning of National League of Cities. Decided after City
of Lafayette, the case did not discuss the existence of a state policy choice being made, but
did observe that airports are indispensible and must be maintained on a municipal level. The
case went on to rule that airport employees were not covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
194. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. at 855.
195. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). "IT]he 'non-
governmental-governmental quagmire' . . . has long plagued the laws of municipal corpora-
tions. A comparative study of the cases in the forty-eight States will disclose an irreconcilable
conflict. More than that, the decisions in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose
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The abandonment of the integral governmental function test in
the antitrust area, and ultimately in the entire realm of federal
regulation, presents a problem, however, where the state has de-
cided to set up an agency to act in a manner which may violate
federal law and which is in an area not historically regarded as an
integral part of governmental activities.'96 Should the district court
on remand in City of Lafayette find that the legislature contem-
plated the type of action complained of through a policy to supplant
competition, serious questions would result because of Chief Justice
Burger's characterization of the municipal utility as "entrepre-
neurial,"'97 a characteristic of state activity which has previously
not been considered protected by the federalist doctrine." For
instance, the utility in City of Lafayette could be analogized to the
state run railroad found in United States v. California.9 ' In that
case, the Court required the railroad to adhere to federal safety
standards:
[W]e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts its railroad
in its "sovereign" or in its "private" capacity. That in operating its railroad
it is acting within a power reserved to the states cannot be doubted .... The
only question we need consider is whether the exercise of that power, in
whatever capacity, must be in subordination to the power to regulate inter-
state commerce, which has been granted specifically to the national govern-
ment. . . .The power of a state to fix intrastate railroad rates must yield to
the power of the national government when their regulation is appropriate
to the regulation of interstate commerce.2®'
One commentator has reconciled the tests for sovereignty intro-
duced in California, Parker and National League of Cities by con-
cluding that all three cases indicate that the "mere status of a state
as a sovereign does not prevent preemption under the supremacy
clause and that only a threat to the constitutionally recognized
the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound." Id.
at 65.
It was recognized by the Fifth Circuit in City of Lafayette that the legislative mandate test,
with its emphasis upon what state laws provide, "will necessarily lead to variations, depen-
dent upon the differing wills of state legislatures." 532 F.2d at 434 n.8.
196. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854; United States v. California, 297 U.S.,
175 (1936).
197. 435 U.S. at 422. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
198. See 425 U.S. at 695-96 and cases cited therein.
199. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
200. Id. at 183-84.
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sovereign activity of a state can inhibit the application of the federal
commerce power." 0' In other words, the railroad in California was
not a constitutionally recognized sovereign activity. If the railroad
had the proper legislative mandate, however, as was prescribed in
City of Lafayette, it might be considered a constitutionally recog-
nized sovereign activity. This contingency may have been the rea-
son for Justice Brennan's caveat early in the City of Lafayette opin-
ion to the effect that the Parker doctrine has been unavailing in
instances where, though the fundamental policy of federalism was
implicated, it was not severely impinged.2 "" As a result, courts in the
future may simply weigh the relative merits of the state policy ver-
sus the federal policy to decide the limits on federal commerce
power over states.0 3
B. Legislative Mandate Test: A Respect for the Policy Choices
of States
The present scope of state sovereignty in the antitrust context
remains predicated on a state legislature's mandate. In the antitrust
context, this development is clearly manifested in the cases from
Parker through City of Lafayette. In each of them, the Court has
been concerned with isolating those areas of sovereign interest to the
states as defined by the state's legislatures themselves. 04 This ap-
pears consistent with Congress' own perception of the limitations on
its commerce clause power.' 5 As the House Report to the Sherman
Act of 1890 stated: "No attempt is made to invade the legislative
authority of the several States or even to occupy doubtful
grounds."'"'
This is not to say that a state can explicitly authorize conduct
which the antitrust laws condemn. Such a view would violate the
very concept of preemption and federal supremacy.0 ' The Parker
201. Davidson & Butters, supra note 118, at 601.
202. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
203, This approach was suggested by Justice Blackmun in National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) and in Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610-11 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). See also, Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 902 (1977).
204. See pt. III supra.
205. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 632 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
206. H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890).
207. See Handler, supra note 178, at 15.
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Court itself warned that "a state does not give immunity to those
who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or
by declaring that their action is lawful." ' 8 Rather, as recognized in
Parker, principles of federalism dictate that courts not lightly at-
tribute to Congress "an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its officers and agents."' "' States thus are protected
from federal regulation insofar as they may provide services in a
manner which consciously supplants federal policies formulated
under the commerce clause. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
summarized in a case subsequent to City of Lafayette, "the state
need not have contemplated the precise action complained of as
long as it contemplated the kind of action to which objection was
made." 10
This basis for state sovereignty is also consistent with the Court's
analygis in National League of Cities. There, the majority was
chiefly concerned with federal regulation displacing "state policies
regarding the manner in which [states] will structure delivery of
. . . governmental services which [a state's] citizens require." ''
Should the standards developed under the Parker doctrine be ap-
plied to all areas of federal regulation, as earlier noted, many of the
ambiguities that resulted from National League of Cities will be
circumvented.
Application of the legislative mandate test, however, may result
in disruption of the federal-state relationship which, ironically, may
violate the spirit of both Parker and National League of Cities.
Many of these problems manifest themselves in the City of
Lafayette decision. As was noted by plurality in City of Lafayette,
state legislatures, in structuring delivery of governmental services,
depend upon municipalities to deal quickly and flexibly with local
problems.2 ' This effectual delegation allows the legislature to de-
vote more time to purely state-wide matters."' By requiring the
legislature to mandate municipal action, however, the Parker analy-
sis "will necessarily diminish the extent to which a State can share
208. 317 U.S. at 351.
209. Id.
210. Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 717 (3d Cir. 1978).
211. 426 U.S. at 847.
212. 435 U.S. at 434-35.
213. Id.
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its power with autonomous local governmental bodies.""' In addi-
tion, state statutes are often enacted with little recorded legislative
history thus making the task of determining what the legislature
contemplated nearly impossible."' As the Court in City of Lafayette
concedes, state legislatures generally give their subordinate
agencies broad operating authority in order for them to have the
flexibility to meet both foreseen and unforeseen situations.'" Thus,
the difficulties of determining what the legislature contemplated
are "bound to discourage state agencies and subdivisions in their
experimentation with innovative social and economic programs.''17
214. Id. at 435.
215. Id. at 436-37.
216. Id. at 414 n.43 (quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968)).
217. 435 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's concern over the impracti-
cality of applying this analysis has not prevented lower courts from distinguishing the type
of activity that comes within a legislative mandate. For example, in Kurek, supra note 135,
the Park District of Peoria, Illinois, which operated five municipal golf courses in that city,
was sued by five golf professionals for alleged antitrust violations in offering pro-shop conces-
sions. The defendant was a unit of local government deriving its powers from various Illinois
statutes. Id. at 585. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit initially addressed the issue
of the qualification of the Park District to utilize the Parker state action defense. Interpreting
Goldfarb and Cantor in much the same way as did the Fifth Circuit, and later the Supreme
Court, in City of Lafayette, the court held that the alleged misconduct by the Park District
was not sovereign "state action." Id. at 589-90. Applying the legislative mandate test, the
court found nothing in the Illinois statutory provisions governing park districts that would
have authorized the type of activity alleged to have taken place. Id. at 590. The court was
unable to discriminate between mandated and non-mandated activities despite broad lan-
guage in the enabling statute empowering the park district to "construct, equip and maintain
. ..golf ... courses . . . as well as necessary facilities pertinent thereto . .. and to
contract in furtherance of any of their corporate purposes .... " Id. at 590 (citations omit-
ted).
The Seventh Circuit found this. language to "fully authorize the Park District to operate
pro shops at its golf course or to make contracts or leases allowing outside parties to operate
such shops." Id. At the same time, the court was able to posit a situation where the case for
a Parker defense would be stronger: if the complaint in Kurek "alleged no more than that
the Park District had substantially reduced relevant competition by operating the shops
itself, foreclosing others, or by determining that the 'corporate purposes' of the District would
be best served by contracting with a single concessionaire for the operation of the shops." Id.
at 590-91 (footnotes omitted).
A similar type of interpretation of a broad enabling statute was made in Star Lines, Ltd.
v. Puerto Rico Maritime Ship. Auth., 451 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Star Lines involved
an antitrust claim against the Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority ("PRMSA") that
allegedly entered into a contract with a shipping company, Pacific Far East Lines ("PFEL").
The effect of this contract was to eliminate the plaintiff, PFEL's only competitor, from the
service of vessels in the East Coast-Persian trade. Applying the legislative mandate test, the
district court first examined what on its face appears to be an enabling statute sanctioning
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Also, legislatures will be forced to foresee these interpretative
difficulties and take measures to avoid them.
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, concluded that pressures resulting
from the test established in City of Lafayette will infringe upon "the
manner in which [States] will structure delivery of those govern-
mental services which their citizens require."2"' The possibility of
stifling a state's innovative public-service programs or burdening
legislatures with the duty to spell out the intended scope and appli-
cation of a law before its enactment is just as threatening to a state's
sovereignty as is forcing the state to pay a minimum wage to the
janitor at the state capitol." 9
This disruption of state policy would result even if the questioned
municipal activity was engaged in for purely parochial interests and
not pursuant to a state policy. For example, enormous costs occa-
sioned by antitrust compliance would financially burden municipal-
ities and deplete funds intended for public programs which may or
may not be sovereign activities. Considering present limitations on
local government budgets, the substantial costs of antitrust compli-
ance'10 could force abandonment of important governmental serv-
all activity with antitrust significance. The act creating PRMSA provided that:
The legislature of Puerto Rico intends that [PRMSA] acquire and operate shipping
lines and terminal facilities as a public service, and that in doing so, it shall not be
subject to the antitrust laws nor any other limitation that could hinder the effective
discharge of the endeavor that this act has imposed on [PRMSA].
Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority Act, Act No. 62 (June 10, 1974) (Statement of
Motives).
In addition, the Act provided that "the Antitrust Laws shall not be applicable to any
section of the Authority taken pursuant to the provisions hereof." Id.
The district court rejected the argument that this broad language granted Parker immun-
ity. The court noted that the intended purpose of the legislation in setting up PRMSA was
to assure the island of a "complete, reliable and economical maritime transportation system
for cargo and passengers between Puerto Rico and abroad." Id. at 166-67. The alleged contract
between PRMSA and PFEL did not directly involve trade with Puerto Rico. As a result the
court found "the connection between the legislative. grant of power to PRMSA and its use of
that power under the facts of this case to be simply 'too tenuous to permit the conclusion
that the entity's intended scope of activity included such conduct.' City of Lafayette, 532 F.2d
431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)." 451 F. Supp. at 167. Citing Kurek, the court suggested specific
circumstances where PRMSA's claim to antitrust immunity would rest on much firmer
ground if "PRMSA had reduced competition in the Puerto Rican-East Coast trade by acquir-
ing a majority of those vessels suitable for engaging in that trade or that PRMSA had
contracted with a single private company to control Puerto Rico's port facilities. 451
F. Supp. at 167.
218. See note 217 supra.
219. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
220. For a thorough discussion of the necessity of having an antitrust compliance program
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ices. While these cost considerations were not central to the Court's
decision in National League of Cities, they were noted by the Court
and should take on special importance in the antitrust field.22 Of
course, liability for treble damages would have an even greater im-
pact on the operation of a municipal government. Petitioners in City
of Lafayette warned that the city's financial liability after trebling
could exceed $1.5 billion, an enormous bill for a few thousand tax-
payers to meet 2 2 Justice Blackmun's dissent was premised on the
majority's failure to address this problem.2 2 3 Justice Blackmun con-
sidered both the Clayton Act's requirement of treble damages and
congressional sentiment adverse to making this remedy discretion-
ary to be central to the issue of liability. 24
The possibility of treble damages may also directly infringe upon
the "sovereignty" of a local governmental unit by inhibiting a mu-
nicipality from addressing its rapidly changing problems with inno-
vative programs which are not customarily considered "integral
governmental functions. "225 Modern government is "increasingly
undertaking social and economic functions that a century ago were
and the form it should take, see J. GARRETr, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: A LEGAL AND BUSINESS
GUIDE (1978). The cost of procuring insurance has been cited by one commentator as posing
an ancillary problem to the imposition of antitrust liability. See Comment, The Erosion of
State Action Immunity From the Antitrust Laws: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and
Light Co., 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 165, 187 (1978).
221. In a recent decision in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Turpin v. Mailet, 579
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated 99 S.Ct. 554 (1978) to be reconsidered in light of Monnell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local governments are not wholly immune
from suit under Civil Rights Act of 1871), it was held that a municipality can be liable in
damages for unconstitutional actions of its employees if the municipality is itself a wrongdoer.
The court, sitting en banc, decided the case in a five to four decision. One of the arguments
made by the dissent was that municipalities today are not in a position to afford a damage
award against them. 579 F.2d at 180 (citing Blackmun's dissent in City of Lafayette). In the
future, as municipalities are forced to pay these awards, the concerns expressed by a number
of these judges will undoubtedly prevail to affect the substantive law. For a more complete
discussion of the ramifications of antitrust treble damage liability on municipalities see Note,
Federal Antitrust Immunity: Exposure of Municipalities to Treble Antitrust Damages Sets
Limit for New Federalism: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 11 CONN. L.
REV. 126 (1978).
222. Brief for Petitioner at 14, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435
U.S. 389 (1978).
223. 435 U.S. at 441. The plurality asserted that the question of remedy can only arise if
the district court on remand determines that the cities' activities are prohibited by the anti-
trust laws. Id. at 402 n.22.
224. Id. at 443.
225. See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
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thought beyond the sphere of government.""2 ' After City of Lafay-
ette, the risk of fiscal devestation through treble damages would
stifle any municipal leader in implementing such programs.
Furthermore, the specter of treble damages may distort the legis-
lative mandate test by forcing increased involvement of the states
in the operation of their agencies and subdivisions. In many situa-
tions, a municipality assessed with treble damages would have no
alternative but to turn to the state in order to satisfy the judg-
ment. 27 This possibility alone might compel a state to exercise a
greater degree of control and scrutiny over the cities' budgets than
it otherwise might. Such a result would be inimical to the federalist
doctrine espoused in National League of Cities.22 1 Moreover, such
control may compel a court to conclude that a state has
"contemplated" actions with antitrust significance and thus make
the application of the Parker exemption automatic. 21
Another problem arising from the legislative mandate test is the
difficulty in establishing the precise form a state policy should take
in order to qualify as a limitation upon federal commerce power.
This problem has been a source of confusion among lower courts
since City of Lafayette. For example, in Star Lines v. Puerto Rico
Maritime Shipping Authority, 20 the district court for the Southern
District of New York found that the "blanket antitrust exemption
provisions contained in the Act creating [the Puerto Rico Maritime
Shipping Authority ("PRMSA") did] not in and of themselves con-
fer antitrust 'immunity' from PRMSA. ' '23 1 Upon an analysis of
Parker and its progeny, the district court decided that PRMSA's
actions did not satisfy two criteria derived from City of Lafayette:
226. See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 1129.
227. "A recent study revealed that the statutes of 15 states provide for a State receiver or
state agency to act as a receiver when a local government unit defaults on its financial
obligations." ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL EMER-
GENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 77 (1973).
228. See pt. II supra.
229. Cf. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 578
(D.N.J. 1967) (no eleventh amendment immunity where turnpike authority has substantial
fiscal and managerial autonomy and is insulated from state treasury); Jagnandam v. Giles,
538 F.2d 1166, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1977) (under state law,
state involved in all aspects of financial management of university).
230. 451 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See note 217 supra.
231. Id. at 166. See note 217 supra for text of act creating PRMSA.
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they "were neither compelled by the state acting as sovereign nor
executed pursuant to any governmental policy to displace market
forces in the area in which PRMSA's activities took place." ' 2
In determining whether the state was "acting as sovereign,"
Judge Carter's opinion in Star Lines focused solely on the issue of
legislative intent as prescribed by City of Lafayette. "We fail to
see," explained the court, "how PRMSA's authority in this regard
suggests an intention by the legislature that in the conduct of its
business on these foreign trade routes PRMSA should seek to estab-
lish a foreign, private entity as a monopolist of a particular route
and seek to eliminate all other competition from participating in
that trade.2 13
Star Lines also concluded that the challenged anticompetitive
activity was not pursuant to a state policy intending to displace
competition with regulation or monopolistic public service. This
second finding appears no different from the first. The court found
that the "legislature focused on insuring adequate carrier and pas-
senger services between Puerto Rico and the mainland, 23 4 not on
displacing "competition in the conduct of international commerce
on a trade route completely removed and unrelated to Puerto
Rico. 13 5 Star Lines determined, under both criteria, that the legis-
lature did not compel anticompetitive activity involving trade out-
side Puerto Rico. This point is underscored by the court's observa-
tion that
if the conduct being challenged here were that PRMSA had reduced competi-
tion in the Puerto Rican-East Coast trade by acquiring a majority of those
vessels suitable for engaging in that trade, or that PRMSA had contracted
with'a single private company to control Puerto Rico's port facilities,
PRMSA's claim to antitrust immunity would be on much stronger ground.131
The court thus viewed PRMSA's enacting legislation as not permit-
ting anticompetitive conduct outside the Puerto Rico-East Coast
trade routes.
One disturbing aspect of this case concerns the court's require-
ment that the legislature "compel" the anticompetitive conduct
232. 451 F. Supp. at 166.
233. Id. at 167.
234. Id. at 168.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 167.
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rather than "contemplate" it as prescribed in City of Lafayette.
While this distinction may not have affected the outcome in Star
Lines, it may in the future change the application of the Parker
doctrine. 37 The Supreme Court had explicitly stated that a political
subdivision need not point to a "specific, detailed legislative author-
ization" before it properly may assert a defense of immunity. 3 An
adequate state mandate exists when it is found" 'from the authority
given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the
legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.' "2139
An indication that the distinction between "compel" and
"contemplate" is more than semantic appears in a recent case de-
cided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States v.
Texas Board of Public Accounting,240 a state instrumentality was
held liable under antitrust laws because its enabling statute did not
mandate anticompetitive activity. In that case, the court scruti-
nized section 5 of the Texas Accountancy Act which provided that
the Texas Board of Accountancy "may promulgate, and may amend
from time to time, rules of professional conduct appropriate to es-
tablish and maintain a high standard of integrity in the profession
of public accountancy .. ."24 The District Court for the Western
District of Texas considered this "permissive, not mandatory, lan-
guage," ' 2 and therefore, the Board could not sanction restraints
against competitive bidding in the accounting industry.4 3
The District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, in City
of Mishawaka, Indiana v. American Electric Power Co.," took a
more liberal view of the legislative mandate test to find that a
municipality-run utility enjoyed immunity from the federal anti-
trust laws. Relying on the Supreme Court's explanation in City of
237. Justice Stewart, in his dissent in City of Lafayette, pointed out the problems that
the vagueness inherent in the legislative mandate test presents. He analogizes the problem
to the cases involving substantive due process where federal judges invalidated state and
municipal economic regulations they thought were unfair. 435 U.S. at 438-40.
238. Id. at 415.
239. Id. (quoting 5th Circuit opinion below).
240. 464 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd and modified, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1979).
241. 464 F. Supp. at 402.
242. Id. at 404.
243. Judge Gie of the Fifth Circuit vigorously dissented from the court's analysis stating
that City of Lafayette did not require mandatory language. 592 F.2d at 919-20.
244. 465 F. Supp 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
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Lafayette that a "specific, detailed legislative authorization"' ' need
not be found, the district court concluded that sufficient state au-
thority to operate as a monopoly can be inferred from a general
statutory mandate to operate a utility.4 The relevant state statute
merely empowered Indiana municipalities to own and operate utili-
ties.247
This apparent discrepancy in interpretatiolls of what will satisfy
the legislative mandate test lends support to Justice Stewart's dis-
sent in City of Lafayette. Justice Stewart stated that the City of
Lafayette test was vague in prescribing the type of state legislative
mandate required for the Parker doctrine to apply. 4' Justice Stew-
art observed that the counterclaim in City of Lafayette alleged, in
essence, that the municipalities engaged in sham litigation, main-
tained their monopolies by debenture covenants, foreclosed compe-
tition by long-term supply contracts, and tied the sale of gas and
water to the sale of electricity." 4 ' According to Justice Stewart,
these actions could be considered the same as "bringing law suits,
issuing bonds and providing electric and gas service, all of which
were activities authorized by [Louisiana] statutes.""25
It has yet to be decided by the district court to which City of
Lafayette was remanded whether or not the utilities' enabling stat-
utes meet the criteria established by the Supreme Court. Because
the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, how-
ever, it appears that the Court does not consider these statutes alone
a sufficient mandate to trigger the Parker doctrine. 5' To what de-
245. 435 U.S. at 415.
246. "The relevant Indiana statutes show that the State of Indiana has authorized its
municipalities to operate as exclusive monopolies of electric, water, sewer, and other utili-
ties." 465 F. Supp. at 1347. See note 247 infra for the text of the Indiana statute.
247. IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-90 (Burns 1973) states, in pertinent part:
Any municipality in the state of Indiana is hereby empowered . . . to own, lease,
erect, establish, purchase, condemn, construct, acquire, hold and operate any utility
within the boundaries of such municipality . . . without the consent or control of any
department, bureau or commission other than the municipal council of the municipal-
ity in which such utility may be operated.
248. 435 U.S. at 435.
249. Id. at 435-36.
250. Id. at 436.
251. The strong language against exemption found in the Louisiana statutes presented to
the Court, 435 U.S. at 414 n.44, suggests the plurality did not comtemplate the possibility of
a finding by the district court on remand that the municipal utility would satisfy the criteria
set up by the Court. However, in a footnote, Justice Brennan reiterates the City of Lafayette
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gree the legislative mandate test will have to be refined will remain
a source of confusion for lower courts. Until the Supreme Court
clarifies this doctrine, state, legislative intent runs the grave risk of
being misinterpreted by the judiciary. Considering the importance
of interpreting a state legislature's mandate on the determination
of the scope of state sovereignty, this problem cannot be neglected
by the Court. The only viable solution may be to turn the Parker
inquiry, and ultimately the entire question of state sovereignty, into
a balancing process where the court will overlook those state legisla-
tive mandates it deems inappropriate in the face of overriding fed-
eral policies. 2 ' Such a result, though inimical to the federalist doc-
trine,253 would forthrightly address the single most difficult issue
which underlies these cases: when should federal policies take pre-
cedence over those of the states.
V. Conclusion
National League of Cities represents a revived sensitivity by the
Supreme Court to the effect of federal regulation on the autonomy
of local and state governments. Announcing this concern, the Court
declared that Congress may not "force directly upon the States its
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of inte-
gral governmental functions are to be made." '54 Unfortunately,
National League of Cities fails to offer workable guidelines for deter-
mining the limits on federal commerce power created by a state's
sovereignty.
Possible clarification of what these limits are may be found in the
antitrust context where the Supreme Court's application of federal-
ism resulted in an exclusion from antitrust laws for state action
thirty years before National League of Cities in Parker v. Brown.
The same court that decided National League of Cities255 considered
the Parker decision on four separate occasions, culminating in City
standards announcing that "municipalities are 'exempt' from antitrust enforcement when
acting as state agencies implementing state policy to the same extent as the State itself."
435 U.S. at 412 n.42.
252. See notes 132, 150-53 & 175 supra and accompanying text.
253. Such a result may also conflict with those decisions which condemned the regime of
substantive due process. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 627 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
254. 426 U.S. at 855.
255. The Goldfarb decision took place prior to Mr. Justice Douglas' retirement and Mr.
Justice Stevens' appointment.
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of Lafayette. There, the Sherman Act was held inapplicable to state
subdivisions acting in a manner contemplated by the state legisla-
ture. The decisions which led to this test of sovereignty under the
antitrust laws circumvented many of the ambiguities inherent in
National League of Cities. While problems exist in attempting to
decipher what are a state's policies, the test under Parker should
assist in defining the scope of state sovereignty as a limit to congres-
sional commerce power.
Whereas National League of Cities served as a check on an in-
creasing amount of federal power over states,25 the Parker doctrine
rightly acknowledges that states and municipalities should not au-
tomatically be allowed to transcend the federal interest in free
trade. Government is emerging as the economy's largest consumer
and to exempt it totally from antitrust regulation would subvert the
goals of our free enterprise system. Principles of federalism upon
which this country was founded, however, demand that states be
allowed to formulate their own methods of delivering the govern-
mental services which they deem important free from interference
of any federal regulation. Significantly, the Parker doctrine's legis-
lative mandate test insures that a state remains free to formulate
its own policies.
Of course, this view presents the risk that some states will abuse
their unique status in the federal system to the detriment of compet-
ing private concerns, consumers and constituents of their states and
neighboring states. Some type of balancing approach by the courts
may thus be necessary to insure that states do not seriously disrupt
the anticompetitive goals of the national government. 57 But as
Judge Henry J. Friendly so aptly observed, "although some state
governments may be ignorant or venal, many are far seeing and
courageous; and not all wisdom reposes in Washington.""25 The judi-
ciary should not lose sight of Chief Justice Chase's vision of "an
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States." '259
Stephen G. Rooney
256. See Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New
Federalism: The Case of Discriminating State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax-
Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv. 473, 488 (1978).
257. The possibility that states will abuse their status to the detriment of national policies
may be limited by the state's constitutional inability to regulate commerce. See TRIBE, supra
note 7, at 326.
258. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1033-34.
259. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868).
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